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TRADE REGULATION - EXPORT CONTROLS - COCOM
AGREES ON NEW MULTILATERAL EXPORT GUIDELINES ALLOWING
EASTERN BLOC TO PURCHASE Low LEVEL TECHNOLOGY LEGALLY
A West German businessman recently pleaded guilty to charges of
submitting a false export license application and supporting docu-
ments.' These falsifications aided a group of international exporters
convicted recently of nine violations of the Export Administration
Act. The scheme involved the export of high technology components
from the United States to a front company in Austria. 2 From Austria
the goods, including specialized integrated circuits used in cruise
missiles, were illegally exported to Eastern Bloc countries.'
The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Exports (CoCom),
a voluntary organization comprised of a majority of the NATO
countries and Japan, 4 seeks to establish mutually agreeable export
control standards. These control standards apply to goods which, if
exported to Eastern Bloc countries, could constitute a threat to the
security of Western society.5 CoCom's most recently adopted export
I Klaus Talleur was sentenced to a six month suspended prison term and one year
of probation. One of his cohorts and business associates received a two year prison
term. West German Businessman Sentenced For Violations, Commerce Announces,
2 INT'L TRADE REP. 1C# (1985).
2 Talleur's company, a West German trade firm doing business under the name
of Contracta Project Engineering and Consultation GmbH, was purported to be the
final destination of the goods; however, Talleur shipped the components to another
firm in Germany by the name of Steuerungstechnik und Messgeraete, which serviced
Eastern Bloc countries. Id.
Id.
The Consultative Group, the predecessor of CoCom, was comprised of export
control officials from the United States, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium,
and Luxembourg; it was formulated in 1949 as a reaction to the Cold War following
the close of World War II. Hunt, Multilateral Cooperation in Export Controls -
The Role of CoCom, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 1285, 1285-86 (1983). The Cold War
between the United States and the U.S.S.R. resulted in large military buildups in
both countries. The United States was concerned for its national security "in large
part from concern over Soviet agressiveness in Germany." 2 S. MORISON, H. CoM-
MAGER & W. LEUCHTENBURY, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 622 (7th
ed. 1980). CoCom membership includes: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Export Ad.
Ann. Rep. FY 1982, at 13 n.l [hereinafter cited as EAA Report 1982].
Hunt, supra note 4. The Eastern Bloc, or CoCom-proscribed countries, consists
of the U.S.S.R., the Warsaw Pact countries, Albania, North Korea, Vietnam,
Kampuchea, the Mongolian People's Republic, and the People's Republic of China.
Export Ad. Ann. Rep. FY 1983, at 28 [hereinafter cited as EAA Report 1983].
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guidelines diverge significantly from prior United States policy because
they permit the previously unauthorized 6 export of low level tech-
nology. 7 The United States favors these guidelines because they more
closely align its trade practices with those of other CoCom nations. 8
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Historically, the United States has advocated stringent guidelines
on the export of all technology, without regard to probability of the
military application. 9 The United States has justified its strict position
by citing national security concerns. 0 Other CoCom member nations,
6 Unfortunately, all CoCom guidelines and proposals are classified, which forces
analysis to be based on scant news releases. CoCom has three categories of controlled
items: the International Atomic Energy List, the International Munitions List, and
the International List. The latter list contains dual use items, a categorization which
has created conflicts within the United States Government and among CoCom
members. The International List consists of items typically used for civilian purposes,
but which also have potential military application. Hunt, supra note 4, at 1288-89;
see also, EAA Report 1982, supra note 4, at 24. For example, the United States
Department of Defense charges that the conventional Apple Computer can be used
to target tactical nuclear weapons and consequently should be put on the dual lists.
The Commerce Department maintains that due to the large number of personal
computers, use of controls would be unmanageable and would divert attention from
truly critical items. The State Department's position is that the "credibility of the
international control mechanism is undermined if you try to control things like
[personal computers] that are traded on a mass world-wide basis." An Opening to
the East for Tiny Computers, Business Week, May 28, 1984, at 31, 32 [hereinafter
cited as An Opening]. Conflicts among CoCom allies have resulted from the differing
policy goals each wishes to emphasize, the general idea being that "allies have
consistently opposed using export restrictions for political purposes not clearly related
to Western security interests." Root, Trade Controls That Work, 52 FOREIGN POLICY
61, (1984).
Low level technology items require only notification to CoCom before export
to Soviet Bloc countries. Previous guidelines imposed complex, expensive, and time
consuming licensing requirements on exporters. Memorandum from Fenwick, Davis
& West (Oct. 21, 1985) (discussing establishment of the G-Com General Export
License).
I The new guidelines permit computers with a 50% or greater processing power
to be exported to the Eastern Bloc. Previously, the United States was one of the
few countries not engaged in the export of this type of technology. U.S. Allies to
Restrict Computer - Technology Exports to Soviet Bloc, Wall St. J., July 23, 1984,
at 14, col. 1.
9 Richey, Washington Counters Soviet Pilfering of its High Tech Know-How,
Christian Sci. Mon., May 18, 1984, at 14.
10 The original United States position in CoCom placed strong emphasis on the
need to impede the U.S.S.R.'s economic and military development. This policy
originated in the early days of the Cold War. Since the recent trend has been to
liberalize trade with the Eastern Bloc, the United States has been forced to reassess
its long-term goals and priorities. Aeppel, The Evolution of Multilateral Export
Controls: A Critical Study of the COCOM Regime, 9 FLETCHER FORUM 105, 113
(1985).
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however, were often neither willing to adopt nor subsequently to
enforce" such narrow guidelines. These nations emphasized trade
considerations' 2 rather than foreign policy 3 or national security con-
cerns.' 4 The United States therefore adopted unilateral export control
guidelines'5 which, because of the lack of a coordinated effort among
,, The majority of CoCom countries do not utilize enforcement mechanisms for
export control; therefore, many illegal foreign exporters must contend only with
inquiries from the Commerce Department if the goods originate in the United States.
A Spanish firm was recently fined $1 million and received five years probation and
suspension of all export privileges from the United States. The Barcelona firm of
Piher Semiconductores had illegally re-exported $2.4 million of electronic test equip-
ment and semiconductors to Cuba and the U.S.S.R. Spanish Firm is Fined $1 Million
in High Technology Diversion Case, 1 INT'L TRADE REP. 1338 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as Spanish Firm]. Additionally, the news media has recently focused on the
black market, which illegally exports advanced computer technology from West
Germ'any and Sweden to the U.S.S.R. Huser, Congress Plans Closer Scrutiny of
Export Policing, Licensing, 1984, CONG. Q., Jan. 28, 1984 at 157; see also supra
notes 1-2.
,2 Karl Kiser, Director of Bonn's Foreign Policy Institute, assessed the situation:
"The fundamental problem is that the American concept of security is overwhelmingly
military in nature," while that of the Europeans is "equally economic." Kempe &
Lachica, CoCom Feuds Over Trade to East Bloc, Wall St. J., July 17, 1984, at 35,
col. 1. For a discussion of policy differences between the United States and Western
Europe, see Yergin, East-West Technology Transfer: European Perspectives, 8 THE
WASHINGTON PAPERS 10 (1980). The opposing perspectives of the United States and
Western Europe have reduced the effectiveness of CoCom over the years: "Europe
and Japan have long advocated reductions in product coverage, and the United
States has lost the power to enforce cooperation." Abbott, Linking Trade to Political
Goals: Foreign Policy Export Controls in the 1970's and 1980's, 65 MINN. L. REv.
739, 807 (1981).
'1 In 1978 the United States denied the export of a computer to TASS, the Soviet
news agency, in response to the conviction of Soviet dissident Anatoly Shcharansky.
The United States sought support for its position from CoCom members in vain.
As a result, French producers agreed with TASS to provide a computer more powerful
than was originally ordered from the United States. France's transaction with the
U.S.S.R. circumvented controls previously set in CoCom, "and thereby emphasiz[ed]
its resolve not to use export controls for political purposes." Root, supra note 6,
at 64-65.
'4 Aeppel, supra note 10.
'1 In 1968, the United States unilaterally restricted approximately 1100 items which
the Eastern Bloc could nonetheless have acquired from other CoCom members.
Consequently, the number of items subject to control in the United States was far
greater than those in other CoCom nations. Meese, Export Controls to China: An
Emerging Trend for Dual-Use Exports, 7 INT'L TRADE L.J., 20, 23 (1982). William
Root, former Director of the State Department's Office of East-West Trade, has
charged that unilateral controls "strengthened the Soviets militarily by slowing the
entire process of establishing effective multilateral controls over militarily significant
items." Root, supra note 6, at 62.
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other CoCom members, proved to be politically1 6 and economically 7
ineffective.
Export guidelines in the United States are codified 8 in the
Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA).19 The EAA desig-
nates three areas of national concern upon which the United
States export restrictions, also known as the Commodity Control
Lists, are based: foreign policy,20 national security, and economic
16 Many Western Europeans view the unilateral controls as an attempt by the
United States to control the export agenda of other foreign entities. This perception
has caused great resentment. For a discussion of the problems encountered with
extraterritorial application of United States law to countries not direct parties to
trade transactions, see Abbott, supra note 12, at 840-43.
'1 Unilateral export guidelines based on foreign policy considerations can lead to
adverse effects, both politically and economically. For example, in 1978 President
Carter utilized unilateral United States export controls on gas and oil exploration
and production equipment to protest the conviction of Soviet dissident Anatoly
Shcharansky. Shortly thereafter, Moscow cancelled a contract with a United States
producer of gas-lift equipment, and switched to a French supplier. This move
exemplifies "Soviet determination not to buy from firms subject to United States
foreign policy controls, except as a last resort." Root, supra note 6, at 64-65.
Industry officials have predicted that the guidelines "will enable United States and
foreign manufacturers to sell hundreds of millions of dollars worth of personal com-
puters to Soviet Bloc customers." An Opening, supra note 6, at 31-32.
,1 The United States, the only CoCom country to codify policy directives, has
declared:
(2) It is the policy of the United States to use export controls only after
full consideration of the impact on the economy of the United States and
only to the extent necessary -
(A) to restrict the export of goods and technology which would
make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other
country or combination of countries which would prove detrimental
to the national security of the United States;
(B) to restrict the export of goods and technology where necessary
to further significantly the foreign policy of the United States to
fulfill its declared international obligations.
50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2402(2)(A) & (B) (1982).
19 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1982).
20 In 1979, Congress established six additional criteria which the President must
consider before imposing export controls. These criteria were "ostensibly for foreign
policy purposes." The additional criteria are:
(1) the probability that controls will achieve their intended purpose in
light of such factors as availability from other countries of items to be
controlled;
(2) the compatibility with overall policy toward the targeted country;
(3) the reactions of other countries;
(4) the trade effects;
(5) the enforceability; and
(6) the foreign policy consequences of not imposing controls.
Meese, supra note 15, at 24-25 [citing 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2405(b) (1981)].
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considerations.2 In addition, the EAA established the Office of Ex-
port Administration (OEA) to formulate export controls on raw
materials and high technology with possible military application.
21
The OEA utilizes three categories of licenses to implement export
controls: the general license, the specific license, and the special
license. 23 Placement of an export item into either the general or specific
license category depends upon the specific technical data to be ex-
ported and the intended destination within the controlled country.
24
Obtaining a general license does not necessitate that applicants submit
documentation to the Commerce Department. 25 Instead, the exporter
must merely match his product with those on a lengthy list of pre-
viously approved items.2
6
Recent amendments have created an additional type of general
license which does not require a validated license for the export of
certain goods to CoCom nations.2 7 Eligibility for this new G-COM
license is based not upon the intended end-user, but rather upon the
technical performance characteristics of a given item; however, written
approval from the Commerce Department is necessary before an item
can be re-exported to a non-CoCom country. 2 These amendments
are expected to impact the high technology industry in the United
21 See generally Comment, Extraterritorial Application of United States Law: The
Case of Export Controls, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 355-56 (1984) (discussion of the
extraterritorial implications in trade regulations). For a discussion of the Commodity
Control List and its application, see Commodity Control List and Related Matters,
15 C.F.R. § 399 (1985).
22 The OEA addresses areas of export licensing, assessment of foreign availability,
and formulation of technical and policy analyses for export controls. A recent
reorganization of the OEA emphasizes the commodity classifications and technical
planning. The Reagan administration hopes this reorganization will help to streamline
CoCom negotiations since OEA would be able to devote a full-time group of "technical
gurus" to the mission. Major Reorganization of Controls Structure At Commence
Department Outlined by Archev, 2 INT'L TRADE REP. 1025 (1985).
23 15 C.F.R. §§ 371-373 (1985).
24 See Meese, supra note 15, at 26. For a discussion of the categorical grouping
of countries along with applicable control restrictions, see Special Country and
Policies and Provisions, 15 C.F.R. § 385 (1985).
23 See generally 15 C.F.R. § 371 (1985) (no application required for general license
and no document issued).
26 See R. Robinson, The Importance of Time in Administrative Decision Making
17 (The Dean Rusk Center Monograph No. 3, 1983) (discussion of the impact
of government regulation of international trade on business).
27 Amendments to Export Administration Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 38,511 (1985)
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 371, 374, 386, & 399).
21 Spanish Firm, supra note 11 and accompanying text (details of penalties imposed
when Commerce approval is not obtained before a product is reported).
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States positively since they will greatly reduce processing time for
exports to CoCom nations. 29
The specific license, in contrast, requires that each item being
exported have an individually validated permit.30 A specific, validated
export license is necessary for the export of a controlled commodity
to any country to which the OEA controls apply.3' The process of
securing a specific validated license is often costly and time con-
suming.32 Generally, the EAA provides for a ninety-day limit on
processing time for export license applications.3 This ninety-day limit
has proven unrealistic, however, for complex Eastern Bloc applica-
tions. Because of their complexity, processing an Eastern Bloc license
application requires an average of 192 work days; some applications
require as many as 547 work days.m
To ease the hardships imposed on exporters utilizing specific val-
idated licenses, Congress created a third category of special licenses,
Among the Commodity Control List items affected are the following: machinery
and equipment for the manufacture of electronic equipment, components and ma-
terials and related test gear; communications transmissions equipment; electronic
measuring, calibrating, counting, testing and/or time interval measuring equipment;
semiconductor diodes and dice and wafers therefor; transistors and dice and wafers
therefor; electronic component assemblies, sub-assemblies, printed circuit board and
microcircuits; electronic computers, peripherals, equipment or systems containing
electronic computers; stored program controlled communication switching equipment
and systems; recording equipment and media. Memorandum, supra note 7.
- See 15 C.F.R. § 372.1(b) (1984) (no technical data on commodity control list
may be exported to any destination without a validated OEA license).
3, For example, a specific validated license "is required for the export of computers
and much peripheral equipment to any destination other than Canada." McKenzie,
The Commerce Department Proposed New Restrictions on Distribution Export Li-
censes, 1 COMPUTER LAW. 24 (1984).
32 Buyers in Hong Kong have curtailed their purchase of technology from the
United States due to increasing licensing delays. An official at Cable and Wireless
Systems in Hong Kong commented that "purchases of American products had
dropped by 28 percent from 1982 to 1983 and likely would be reduced by more
than 80 percent this year." Auerback, Writing Off U.S. Suppliers, Washington Post
Nat'l Weekly Ed., May 21, 1984, at 21, col. 2. It takes approximately 90 days for
the Commerce Department to process license applications. Huser, Bargain on Export
Procedure Struck by Conference Panel, 1984 CONG. Q., May 26, 1984, at 1264, col.
1.
33 U.S. Congress, House, Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade,
Extension and Revision of the Export Administration Act of 1969, Part 1, 96th
Congress, 1st Sess. 1979, 589.
14 The routine Eastern Bloc license application requires an average of 88 working
days for processing, with the maximum being 207. A moderately complex appli-
cation requires on average 102 working days, with the maximum being 235 days.
J. McIntyre, Uncertainty in Business - Government Relations: The Dynamics of
International Trade Policy 61 (The Dean Rusk Center Monograph No. 2, 1983).
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the most important of which is the distribution license.35 The majority
of items on the Commodity Control List are exported through use
of a distribution license.3 6 The use of a single distribution license is
more economical, both in terms of time and money,17 than the use
of multiple specific validated licenses.38 Unlike the specific validated
license, a single distribution license authorizes multiple shipments of
a single controlled commodity to approved consignees in specified
countries for a period of one year.3 9 Thus, exporters can save time
and money since application for separate specific validated licenses
is not required for individual shipments of the same commodity to
the same approved destination. 40
Despite these benefits, Congress received complaints from both the
public and private sectors concerning the current distribution licensing
procedures. Commerce Department officials expressed concern that
distribution licenses were being utilized to assist the illegal re-export
of commodities to controlled destinations . 4  Private sector officials
complained both that the processing time for applications was unduly
lengthy42 and that the list of items available for export was too
narrow .
4
3 15 C.F.R. § 373.3 (1985).
36 Amendments to the Distribution License Procedure, 49 Fed. Reg. 35,790 (1984)
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 373 & 376).
31 Distribution license sales represent at least $20 billion a year for high technology
companies in the United States. Commerce Department Issues Revised Regulations
for Distribution Licenses, 1 INT'L TRADE REP. 253, 254 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Revised Regulations).
11 This is especially true when goods are inexpensive and could not support the
cost of a specific validated export license for each transaction. McKenzie, supra
note 31, at 24.
39 Id.
40 See generally supra note 37.
4, In an effort to deter violations of export regulations, the Commerce Department
levied a $1.5 million civil penalty against Digital Equipment Corporation. The
Commerce Department agreed to suspend payment of $400,000 of the fine during
a three-year probationary period, however, and to waive payment of that portion
if Digital restrains from further illegal activities. The remaining $1.1 million is the
largest penalty to be levied by the Commerce Department for violations of the
Export Administration Act. Digital's violations consisted of the completion of nu-
merous sales of computers to a German firm, Deutsche Integrated Time, which
earlier had been denied export privileges due to prior convictions of illegally re-
exporting computers originating in the United States to the Eastern Bloc. Digital
Equipment Corp. Fined $1.5 Million for Violations in Largest Penalty Ever Paid,
1 INT'L TRADE REP. 259 (1984).
42 See Huser, supra note 32.
11 See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (discussion of the narrow United
States unilateral export controls).
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In response to these concerns, Congress amended the EAA. These
amendments attempt to make exporters self-regulating through the
development of internal audit programs. Most major companies al-
ready use such programs." The new audit programs place primary
responsibility for export controls on the individual exporter. 45 To
deter potential abuses, the amendments establish strict penalties, in-
cluding license revocation and criminal charges, for violators. 46 The
exporters also bear the burden of assuring the Commerce Department
of the integrity and reliability of all parties involved in the trans-
action 7
II. COMMENT
The self-regulatory program eliminates the previous requirement
that each applicant be granted a certain number of specific validated
licenses or complete a certain number of transactions to be eligible
The Commerce Department reports that most major high technology export
firms already use an internal monitor to control exports. Vincent Greenwald, of the
Exporter Services Division of the Commerce Department, predicts that individual
exporters will have major incentives to enforce the appropriate distribution license
regulations. Foremost will be the selective audits performed by the Commerce De-
partment. Telephone interview with Vincent Greenwald, Exporter Services Division
of the Commerce Department (Sept. 27, 1984).
41 The proposals specifically require the following:
(1) that license applicants have an adequate internal control program
consisting of an identification of positions in the firm and consignee firms
responsible for compliance with the distribution license procedure require-
ments;
(2) systems for assuring compliance with product and country restrictions;
(3) an internal audit system or program;
(4) nuclear and end-use/end user controls;
(5) an education program for those in the firm and consignee firms
involved in distribution license sales;
(6) a system for distribution and verification of receipt by consignee of
the Denial List and related material;
(7) a way to screen customers against the list; and
(8) a process of screening original equipment manufacturers (OEM's),
including the collection and analysis of information on the OEM principals,
size, and sales volume.
Revised Regulations, supra note 37.
46 Greenwald, supra note 44.
" Jake Garn (R-Utah), Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, criticized
recommendation of an internal audit system. Garn charged that the changes in the
distribution licensing amendments had reduced the control mechanism to "little more
than an honor system." Garn also accused the Commerce Department of bowing
to the business sector's demands due to the Department's "inherent protrade [sic]
bias." Garn Criticizes New Distribution License Regulations, Says Banking Will
Hold Hearing, 1 INT'L TRADE REP. 300 (1984).
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for a distribution license. 8 In addition, the amendments focus only
on "truly critical" technology, thus narrowing the list of items
ineligible for a distribution license. 49 Once a firm gains administrative
approval for its internal audit plan,50 the benefits become apparent.
Application of the amendments to the distribution licensing proce-
dures should decrease processing time, and fewer applicants should
be declared ineligible.5 Further, the new distribution licensing pro-
cedures should boost the competitiveness of United States high tech-
nology industries, without sacrificing safeguards against the illegal
export of goods to the Eastern Bloc.12
The impact of the amendments to the distribution licensing pro-
cedures would be even more pronounced if the United States and a
substantial number of other member nations were to approve the
CoCom guidelines.5 3 Adoption of the CoCom proposals would trig-
ger additional relaxation of the stringent controls currently utilized
4 See Revised Regulations, supra note 37. The proposals require that each pro-
spective exporter successfully complete a pre-license review program by the Commerce
Department. The "proposals also require pre-approval consultations and pre-license
audits of applicants unknown to the department, a more extensive post-license audit
program, and contains safeguards against firms that fail to comply." Press Release
from Daniel Landa, Office of the Secretary of Commerce (Sept. 10, 1984) (discussing
revisions to proposed distribution license rules).
41 See Revised Regulations, supra note 37 (impact of the revised distribution license).
10 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (requirements for an audit plan).
I See Revised Regulations, supra note 37 (impact of the revised distribution license).
32 The new distribution license proposals are viewed as a victory for high-technology
firms which had warned that tighter controls "could cause unnecessary paperwork,
shipment delays and the loss of overseas customers to Japanese and European
competitors." Lachica, U.S. Eases Position on Tighter Controls for Some Exporters,
Wall St. J., Sept. 11, 1984, at 2, col. 3. Congressman Don Bonkers, sponsor of
the bill, reported that the goal of the legislation is "to unshackle industry so that
they can compete more effectively" by controlling only critical technology. Huser,
supra note 32.
" Sources within the governmental affairs branch of Honeywell, Inc. anticipate
that adoption of the CoCom guidelines will allow export to the Eastern Bloc of the
following non-strategic, low-performance computers:
(1) Personal computers with a PDR of less than 2 mega bits/second;
(2) Incorporated (removable) computers with a PDR of less than 5 mega
bit/second;
(3) Embedded (non-removable) computers with PDR of less than 28 mega
bits/sec.
Interview with Pamela K. Young, Manager, Federal Affairs, Honeywell, Inc. (Oct.
11, 1984).
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by the United States,5 ' and make a greater number of items eligible
for export via the distribution license." The changes in the CoCom
control list, in conjunction with the amendments to the distribution
licensing system, should result in a greater quantity of noncritical items
being eligible for export from the United States to the Eastern Bloc
in a more efficient manner.5 6
For CoCom to prevent the Eastern Bloc's acquisition of militarily
useful technology effectively, the export guidelines must be approved
and enforced unanimously. 7 Yet, as with most multinational groups,
internal harmony and unanimous support for policy directives are
objectives which realistically are seldom achieved.58 Unanimous policy
support and enforcement are particularly difficult to obtain in CoCom
because membership is purely voluntary.5 9 Furthermore, members
prefer to act by "gentleman's agreement," which requires decision
14 The United States would have to amend its current Commodity Control List
to reflect the changes it has proposed to CoCom. Otherwise, after the adoption the
CoCom amendments would not be implemented legally. Interview with Roman W.
Sloniewsky, Deputy Assistant General Counsel for Domestic Commerce, in Wash-
ington, D.C. (Oct. 11, 1984).
55 For a detailed discussion of the amendments to the distribution licenses, see
Revised Regulations, supra note 37.
56 CoCom members concede that the group's major problem is that members
usually ignore CoCom policy when national interests are at stake. Internal CoCom
sources quickly implicated French authorities as the worst offenders. See Kempe &
Lachica, supra note 12. Sources within the State Department, however, indicated
that the CoCom countries violate the established policy only in extraordinary cir-
cumstances. Officials within CoCom rely heavily upon the art of diplomacy to make
CoCom an effective organization. Telephone interview with Bob Campbell, Research
Analyst at the State Department (Aug. 20, 1984).
51 William Root, former chief of the United States Negotiating Team to CoCom
has blamed a substantial portion of CoCom's ineffectiveness on the United States.
This blame is due in large part to the lack of a unified position within the United
States. For example, Root contends that "CoCom computer negotiations were un-
successful for six years largely because of U.S. intransigence in the face of constructive
allied suggestions." Root, supra note 6, at 68.
11 Recently, the United States had lobbied to legitimize CoCom further via mul-
tinational treaty. Had CoCom been given treaty status, a policy enforcement mech-
anism would have existed. The treaty efforts have been abandoned, however, because
West European delegates indicated that they would have been unable to obtain the
necessary parliamentary approval. Kempe & Lachica, supra note 12.
11 CoCom operates on a very informal basis; enforcement mechanisms are not a
viable option since membership is purely voluntary. Aeppel, supra note 10, at 108-
09. "The basic challenge of all politics is to arrive at a fair and workable har-
monization of conflicting individual, group, and aggregate human needs." Unfor-
tunately, this challenge is rarely met. T. COULOUMBIS & J. WOLFE, INTRODUCTION
TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: POWER AND JUSTICE 10 (1978).
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by unanimous vote. This preference is unfortunate since CoCom's
members do not always honor their gentlemanly agreements. Members
often reserve the right to act independently based on their individual
legal, policy, and administrative situations. 60 Individual members are
thus free to deviate from approved export standards.
6
'
Before CoCom policy guidelines can be enforced unanimously, the
United States and CoCom individually and collectively must solidify
their policy formation process. 62 Unfortunately, no single adminis-
trative body in the United States is responsible for coordinating
participation in CoCom; instead, this function is divided among the
Departments of State,63 Commerce, and Defense.6 In planning United
States participation in CoCom, each of these departments seeks pri-
marily to further its individual policy goals; 65 consistency in the
regulation of United States participation in CoCom is often only a
secondary concern.6 The division of authority among these depart-
60 EAA Report 1982, supra note 4, at 24.
61 Ke'mpe & Lachica, supra note 58 and accompanying text.
62 Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) stressed the importance of avoiding interagency
disputes: "[wihen such disagreements persist, the government renders itself nearly
incapable of setting a balanced and reasonable export control policy that is responsible
to national security needs but fair to American business at the same time." News
Release from United States Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations (Oct. 15,
1984) (discussing Department of Defense's role in export decisions) [hereinafter cited
as News Release].
61 Unnamed sources from the State Department have blamed the Defense De-
partment's refusal to cooperate with other CoCom countries as a key factor which
led to William Root's resignation as Director of the State Department's Office of
East-West Trade. Auerbach, Export Risks Lead to Pentagon, Wash. Post, Apr. 3,
1984, at D8, col. 5.
" The Commerce Department charges that the Defense Department "lacks sen-
sitivity to private sector concerns about the detrimental impact of national security
export controls on the United States international trade." Conversely, the Defense
Department complains "that the Commerce Department is primarily a trade pro-
motion agency and is thus not well suited to police high-tech imports." See Richey,
supra note 9. Senator Nunn (D-GA), Spokesman of the Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations, reported that "lengthy interagency disputes can be avoided when
the Pentagon's technical assessments are presented as being strictly technical." The
subcommittee report stressed that the Department of Defense's contribution to export
guidelines should be of a purely technical, not political and ideological, perspective.
News Release, supra note 62.
61 See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text; see also Hosenball, infra note
66 and accompanying text (discussion of departmental conflicts between Commerce,
Defense, and State).
"[Ilnteragency disagreement pits conservatives in the Pentagon, who want to
see rei4.Jvely tight controls on small computer shipments to the Eastern Bloc, against
State and Commerce officials who argue that such controls are impractical, potentially
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ments was originally conceived as a means to insure that the interests
of each department were represented adequately. 67 Unfortunately,
each department seems to disregard the other departments, producing
a lack of cohesion in United States policy toward CoCom. This
divisive approach has proven fatal in the past to the formation of
policy. 6
In addition to the lack of consistency in United States policy,
individual CoCom members have differing interests, creating addi-
tional conflicts within CoCom and making enforcement of export
controls difficult. 69 Western Europe, in contrast with the United
States, is reluctant to use export controls for political purposes. In
fact, some Western European leaders have charged that CoCom is
an over-politicalized, irresponsible organization doing nothing to deter
the flow of technology and information to the Eastern Bloc. 70 As a
result of perceived inefficiencies within CoCom, Western Europeans
have become less satisfied with tighter restrictions which the United
States has advocated in the past. 7' These inter-CoCom conflicts cul-
minated in a recent breakdown in negotiations on export controls
for personal computers, prompting United States officials to reassess
means previously utilized to obtain trade agreements.72
economically harmful to the United States, and irritating to the allies." Hosenball,
U.S., CoCom Trying to Set New Small CPU Policy, Electron News, Apr. 30, 1984,
at 4, col. 4.
67 See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
The tri-departmental disagreements regarding computer technology prompted
Ambassador Abraham Katz, permanent United States delegate to CoCom, to send
a telegram to the various departments complaining about the lack of departmental
unity. Hosenball, supra note 66. Due to departmental conflicts the new guidelines
on personal computers took more than six years to complete. Root, supra note 7,
at 68-69.
69 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (examples of ineffective enforce-
ment of export controls).
70 "Allied reluctance to use trade controls to punish odious Soviet behavior is
usually attributed to the higher priority they allegedly place on trade." Root, supra
note 6, at 61.
1, West Germany's Economic Minister, Martin Bangemann, refused to consider
tighter restrictions on export controls. He predicted that other countries not quite
so closely bound to the United States as West Germany would not agree to future
restraints on exports. German Economic Minister Says U.S. Pressure For Restrictions
Unacceptable, May Retaliate, 1 INT'L TRADE REP. 178 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
German Minister Comments].
72 Completion of the latest CoCom computer guidelines took approximately six
years, in part due to the unbending attitude of the United States. Root, supra note
6, at 68-69.
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Previously, many Western Europeans felt forced to adopt guidelines
advocated by the United States since many European industries were
dependent on United States technology. 73 Ten years ago the United
States was credited with the development of seventy percent of the
world's technology, while for 1984 that figure was fifty percent. Pre-
dictions indicate that this figure may fall to as low as thirty percent
by 1994. 74 Consequently, many Western Europeans no longer feel
economically or technologically dependent on the United States and
have ignored many of these earlier guidelines. For example, some
Western Europeans have made significant steps toward domination
of the personal computer market by using national interest exceptions
in CoCom, even though they had earlier agreed to controls.75
The past ineptness of CoCom's policy 76 has forced the United
States to take a more realistic approach to export controls. Recent
developments indicate that the United States has realized that CoCom
agreements will be ineffective unless enforced multilaterally by mem-
ber countries. 77 A willingness to compromise on CoCom personal
computer controls indicates that the United States will align itself
more closely with the practices of Western Europeans.7 1 In the past,
the United States has used highly restrictive export controls as a
means of economic warfare against communist nations, a practice
not followed by Western Europeans. 79 If this trend toward decontrol
71 See German Minister Comments, supra note 71.
74 Aeppel, supra note 10, at 107 (discussion of economic factors which have
produced changes within CoCom).
11 Auerback, China Hits Slowness of High Tech Imports, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24,
1984, at D9, col. 1.
76 See supra note 13 and accompanying text (example of a CoCom nation blatantly
ignoring a CoCom export control, undermining CoCom's effectiveness).
77 See Root, supra note 6. In a recent Senate report regarding the transfer of
technology, the National Science Foundation estimated that the percentage of United
States high technology sales compared to that of other nations has declined from
75% to 50% and may fall as low as 30% by the end of the decade. This prediction
is based on the fact that other nations have made significant progress in the de-
velopment of high technology industries. Thus, for the United States "to succeed
in keeping certain key militarily useful technologies out of the hands of Communist
adversaries like the Soviet Union, American efforts must be coordinated with other
major suppliers." PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
SENATE, TRAN sFER OF TECHNOLOGY REPORT, S. Doc. No. 664, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
24 (1984).
78 "The agreement is particularly significant since it is expected to serve as a model
for accords now being negotiated in regard to other militarily sensitive technologies."
Aeppel, supra note 10, at Ill.
19 Meese, supra note 15, at 23.
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of previously restricted commodities continues, 0 then pro-trade con-
cerns will likely achieve a more prominent role in future export control
negotiations for the United States.8'
High technology industries will certainly prosper if the United States
continues its emphasis on economic and trade considerations.12 This
shift in focus will lead to decontrol of items not militarily critical.
Long-range planning will necessitate that control items be selected
based on their specific military relevance to the Eastern Bloc's current
technical deficiencies.83 Consequently, the United States will be in a
- For example, President Carter used stricter controls of high technology as a
foreign policy tool to show official displeasure with the U.S.S.R.'s invasion of
Afghanistan. Additional restrictions included: "revocations and denials of high-
technology export licenses; controls on the export of grain and certain agricultural
products; an embargo on the sale of phosphates for fertilizer; and severe restrictions
on the sale of technology to produce equipment used in oil and gas production."
Id. at 20 n.2.
11 China represents an example of the relaxed United States attitude toward export
controls for Communist countries. In 1980, the Reagan administration took steps
to relax trade restrictions further for China. Approximately twice the prior level of
technology is now available for export to China. Reagan has committed his admin-
istration to the achievement of a formal differentiation between the Eastern Bloc
and China. Yergin, supra note 12, at 3. Recently the administration established a
special China Team Center to speed license application for the export -of goods to
China. Progress on CoCom Controls for China Reported by Archey in Hill Tes-
timony, 2 INT'L TRADE REP. 1295 (1985).
82 The most significant changes in the United States will be felt by producers of
personal computers. The Apple 2-Plus, the Atari-400 and 800 series, the Radio Shack
TRS-80 models two and three, and the Canon ex-1 no longer will be subject to the
unilateral controls within the United States. New CoCom Guidelines on Computer
Exports Tighten Curbs, Defense Department Maintains, 1 INT'L TRADE REP. 87
(1984). The Industry Coalition on Technology Transfer (ICTT), which represents
more than 3,000 high-technology firms with over 4 million employees, estimates that
their worldwide sales are currently greater than $250 billion. Their export income
represents approximately 30% of their output compared with only 8% for other
United States manufacturers. These high returns have resulted in productivity which
is six times greater than that of other United States industries. Transfer of Technology:
Hearings before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm.
on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 208-09 (1984) (statement of W. Clark
McFadden II, on behalf of ICTT).
11 Former State Department Official Calls for Controls Changes in Journal Article,
1 INT'L TRADE REP. 260 (1984). The Reagan administration recently released a list
of items the U.S.S.R. wishes to acquire. The Technology Transfer Intelligence Com-
mittee, organized under the auspices of the Central Intelligence Agency, gathered the
information. The report indicates that Moscow's Military Industrial Commission "seeks
'one-of-a-kind military and dual-use hardware, blueprints, product samples, and test
equipment to exploit and use to improve the technical levels and performance of
Soviet weapons, military equipment, and defense manufacturing equipment."'
Administration Releases Update of Report on Soviet Acquisition of West's Tech-
nology, 2 INT'L TRADE REP. 1257 (1985).
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better position to compete with Western Europe for the export of
low level technology. 84
III. CONCLUSION
Whether CoCom has achieved its policy objective is still debatable.
CoCom's mission is to implement a plan which will guard its members
against military or economic threat from the Eastern Bloc, while
enhancing trade among the nations involved. 5 Changes in distribution
licensing procedures should insure a relatively high degree of com-
pliance due to costly penalties imposed for violations.8 6 At the same
time, CoCom's scaled-down guidelines for low level technology pose
no increased military threat. In short, the guidelines allow the United
States to export items which are currently available to the Eastern
Bloc from a variety of foreign sources. 87 As a result, CoCom remains
an important and viable organization capable of focusing international
attention upon export issues. 88
Jackie L. Masden
14 See supra notes 8, 17, 24, 52, 53, and accompanying text (examples of items
affected by the new export guidelines).
1 The CoCom strategy to keep Western society safe is aimed at preventing critical
high technology from reaching the Eastern Bloc. This goal is unrealistic since the
Eastern Bloc will eventually acquire the technology through its own internal ad-
vancements; at best CoCom can only impede the Eastern Bloc's technological progress
via controls.
86 See supra notes 1, 2, 41, 48 and accompanying text (examples of fines imposed
for violation of export controls and an explanation of the internal audit plan).
11 See supra notes 8, 13, 32, 52 and accompanying text (examples of how the
United States will be more competitive).
11 Despite CoCom's shortcomings, members still want to participate in CoCom
since "[wlithout this organization, competition among Western exporters would have
escalated the technology sales to the East." Kempe & Lachica, supra note 12.

